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Abstract
■ Although humans generally experience a coherent sense
of selfhood, we can, nevertheless, articulate different aspects
of self. Recent research has demonstrated that one such as-
pect of self—conceptual knowledge of oneʼs own personality
traits—is subserved by ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC).
Here, we examined whether an alternative aspect of “self”—
being an agent who acts to achieve oneʼso w ng o a l s —relies
on cognitive processes that overlap with or diverge from con-
ceptual operationalizations of selfhood. While undergoing
fMRI, participants completed tasks of both conceptual self-
reference, in which they judged their own or another personʼs
personality traits, and agentic self-reference, in which they
freely chose an object or watched passively as one was chosen.
The agentic task failed to modulate vMPFC, despite producing
the same memory enhancement frequently observed during
conceptual self-referential processing (the “self-reference” ef-
fect).Instead,agenticself-referencewasassociatedwithactivation
of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), a region previously implicated
in planning and executing actions. Experiment 2 further demon-
stratedthatIPSactivitycorrelatedwithlatermemoryperformance
for the agentic, but not conceptual, task. These results support
views of the “self” as a collection of distinct mental operations
distributed throughout the brain, rather than a unitary cognitive
system. ■
INTRODUCTION
One of the most puzzling—yet unavoidable—features of
the human mind is our introspective experience of being
ac o h e r e n t“self.” Except in rare instances of pathology,
we experience ourselves as having stable, idiosyncratic
personality traits and a single, introspective awareness;
we view ourselves as the authors of our own, freely willed
actions and as the protagonists in a unique autobiographi-
cal narrative; and we demarcate ourselves as individuals
who, although distinct from other people, are neverthe-
less defined by our roles, obligations, and personal rights
withinalargersociety.Breakdownsinoneormoreofthese
aspects of selfhood have been implicated in a variety of
psychiatricandneuropsychologicaldisorders,rangingfrom
schizophrenia (Frith, 2005; Stirling, Hellewell, & Quraishi,
1998), to alien hand syndrome (Doody & Jankovic, 1992;
Feinberg, Schindler, Flanagan, & Haber, 1992), to loss of
oneʼs personal identity (Klein, Rozendal, & Cosmides,
2002; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996).
Although attempts to understand the nature of this
complex, multifaceted experience of human selfhood
have historically been the purview of philosophers, the
development of empirical approaches to the self has re-
cently emerged as a central enterprise across the cognitive
sciences. Much of this work has built on observations,
dating back to the 1970s, that processing information in a
self-referential manner leads to unique patterns of later
behavioral performance. For example, perceivers better
remember words that they previously encoded with refer-
ence to themselves (“does the word curious describe
you?”) than to another person, a phenomenon known
as the “self-reference effect” (Symons & Johnson, 1997;
Bowers & Gilligan, 1979; Markus, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper, &
Kirker, 1977). Similarly, the engagement of distinct cogni-
tiveprocessesforself-referentialthoughtislikewisethought
to underlie such diverse phenomena as the tendency to
overvalue items that belong to oneself (the “the endow-
ment effect”; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990); differ-
ences in the explanations given for oneʼso w nb e h a v i o r
relative to the behavior of others (the “fundamental attribu-
tion error”; Jones & Nisbett, 1971); and the assignment of
different probabilities to chance outcomes when perceivers
themselves participate in the events, for example, by choos-
ing their own lottery numbers or rolling dice (Langer, 1975,
1977).
Inspired by these observations, researchers have recently
brought the techniques of cognitive neuroscience to bear
on a specific question about the self: Does self-referential
thinking rely on cognitive operations that are distinct from
other mental processes? For example, in a series of stud-
ies, Heatherton et al. (2006), Macrae, Moran, Heatherton,
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Banfield, and Kelley (2004), and Kelley et al. (2002) exam-
ined whether the mnemonic benefits of self-referential pro-
cessing come about because of differences in the neural
systems deployed when thinking about self and others. Pro-
viding evidence in favor of such a dissociation, these re-
searchers described a region of ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vMPFC) that is engaged preferentially during intro-
spection about oneʼs own personality traits (compared to
those of another person), and, moreover, in which activity
during encoding predicts whether self-relevant informa-
tion will later be remembered or forgotten. To the extent
that such neural dissociations reflect corresponding differ-
ences in cognitive processing, these data suggest that self-
reference does, indeed, engage a unique set of mental
operations.
More recent neuroimaging findings have further sug-
gested that a number of different aspects of self all con-
verge on MPFC. For example, in addition to its role in
conceptual judgments about oneʼs personality, this region
contributes to autobiographical memory (Maguire, 2001),
monitoring oneʼs own thoughts (Mason et al., 2007), re-
portingoneʼsattitudes(Mitchell,2009b),andthesubjective
experience of emotion (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon,
2002). Indeed, such findings have prompted a number of
researchers to posit a general role for MPFC (and related
midline cortical regions) in subserving “the self,” broadly
construed (Schneider et al., 2008; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange,
& Keenan, 2007; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; cf. Gillihan
& Farah, 2005).
Recent cognitive work has likewise suggested the
unity of self, by demonstrating that different kinds of self-
referential processing can produce common behavioral
effects.For example,extendingtheclassicself-reference ef-
fect in memory, Cloutier and Macrae (2008) demonstrated
enhanced recall for self-relevant information with a task in
which participants alternated between freely acting over
an item (choosing numbered slips of paper from a bowl)
and passively watching another person perform the same
task. That is, situations in which participants experienced
agency—the sense of acting deliberately and freely on an
object of oneʼsc h o i c e —were associated with the same
augmented memory performance as situations, studied
since the 1970s, in which they introspect conceptually about
their personality traits and dispositions.
However,commentatorssinceWilliamJames(1890)have
highlighted the complex and paradoxical nature of the self.
Although we typically experience “self” as a singular entity,
we can, nevertheless, conceive of and articulate different
aspects of selfhood (also see Boyer, Robbins, & Jack, 2005;
Gallagher, 2000; Humphrey, 2000; Neisser, 1988). This
recognition of the multifaceted nature of our first-person
experience has prompted a critical question about the cog-
nitive architecture underlying the various aspects of self:
Does our overall sense of selfhood emerge from a single,
discrete set of mental processes or is the “self” better
conceptualized as a confederacy of different cognitive
mechanisms, each performing some unique function? In
other words, having established that at least some experi-
ences of selfhood rely on cognitive processes distinct from
non-self-referential mentation, researchers have begun to
ask a second-level question about dissociations among dif-
ferent aspects of self: Do the various experiences of self
draw on a single set of processes that are specialized for
representing self-relevant information, or do different as-
pects of self draw on distinct cognitive mechanisms?
Indeed, there are several reasons to suspect that agentic
aspects of self will differ in important respects from the
more “conceptual” and autobiographic aspects of self that
have been linked to MPFC. Recently, researchers have im-
plicated MPFC in tasks that require the suspension of cur-
rent, externally directed processing in favor of internally
focused mentation that is detached from the immediate
perceptual environment (for review, see Mitchell, 2009a;
Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Consistent with these observa-
tions, the aspects of self known to rely on MPFC involve
exactly this kind of introspective, abstract, and context-free
processing; for example, autobiographical memory re-
quiresthat one transcendthe current situationand mentally
simulate the past, whereas thinking about oneʼsp e r s o n a l i t y
traits demands integration over a lifetime of relevant epi-
sodes in which a particular trait could be expressed. In
contrast, the sense of oneself as an agent is inherently tied
to the here-and-now. As defined by Wegner (2002), our
conscious sense of agency is “experienced when we per-
form an action—actions feel willed or not, and this feeling
of voluntariness or doing a thing ‘on purpose’ is an indica-
tion of conscious will” (p. 3). Successful recognition of one-
self as the free author of an action requires attention not
only to oneʼs current movements but to the effects of such
behavior on the external environment. A sense of agency
cannot be achieved through detachment from the immedi-
ateperceptualcontext, but only arisesoutofthecouplingof
internal goals with their consequences in the environment.
Hence, despite the empirical consensus that “the self”
broadly relies on midline structures such as MPFC, we
hypothesized that conceptual and agentic aspects of self-
hood will rely on distinct cognitive processing and underly-
ing neural substrates. In the current studies, we specifically
asked whether the common mnemonic effects of concep-
tual and agentic self-reference draw, in turn, on common
or distinct cognitive processing. Participants completed a
standard task of conceptual self-knowledge, in which they
alternately judged how well various trait adjectives describe
either themselves or a familiar other. In addition, partici-
pants completed a second task designed to manipulate
the subjective sense of acting agentically toward a specific
object. Following the earlier demonstrations by Cloutier
and Macrae (2008), this agentic self-reference task alter-
nately required participants to select an object (computer-
ized cards that “turned over” to reveal a word) or obliged
them to watch passively as another player selected one.
As in the sizeable number of studies that have examined
the neural basis of conceptual self-referential processing,
we expected to observe greater activity in vMPFC during
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judgments of oneʼs personality than the personality of
another person (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 2008;
Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008; DʼArgembeau et al.,
2007; Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007; Heatherton et al.,
2006; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Moran, Macrae,
Heatherton,Wyland,&Kelley,2006;Louetal.,2004;Macrae
et al., 2004; Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus, & Johnson, 2004;
Johnsonetal.,2002;Kelleyetal.,2002;Zysset,Huber,Ferstl,
& von Cramon, 2002). Critically, to the extent that agentic
self-referential processing relies on a similar set of cognitive
processes, we also expected to observe similar modulation
of vMPFC activity associated with items selected by oneself
versus those selected by another person on the agentic self-
reference task. In contrast, if oneʼs subjective sense of
agency relies on different cognitive processing than oneʼs
conceptual self-knowledge, we expected to observe a reli-
able neural dissociation between the regions modulated
by self versus other across the two tasks.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were right-handed, native English speakers
withnohistoryof neurologicalproblemswhogaveconsent
in a manner approved by the Human Studies Committee
of the Massachusetts General Hospital. Experiment 1 in-
cluded 13 participants (9 women; mean age = 20 years;
range = 18–24 years). Experiment 2 included 18 partici-
pants(8women;meanage=20years;range=18–31years),
in addition to two participants who were excluded due to
a technical error that prevented data analysis.
Behavioral Procedure
Agentic Self-reference Task
During scanning, participants alternately selected items
from a set of 52 “cards” or watched as a computerized
partner select an item. Cards were depicted as white, num-
bered rectangles presented on a black background. At the
beginning of each trial, participants viewed a prompt read-
ing either “YOU” or “COMPUTER” in the middle of the
screen, which indicated whether the participant or the
computer was to select a card. This prompt was displayed
for 1 sec and was then replaced by four cards displayed hori-
zontally across the screen (Figure 1). During “self” trials,
participants selected a card by pressing one of four re-
sponse buttons with their right hand. Participants were
obliged to make their response within a window of 2 sec,
after which the selected card was “turned over” to reveal
a word. If the participant failed to select a card during the
2-sec response window, the computer randomly picked
t h ec a r dt or e v e a l ;s u c ht r i a l sw e r ee x c l u d e df r o ms u b -
sequent analyses (on average, 8% of trials across both ex-
periments). During “other” trials, participants were asked
to press a fifth button with their right thumb, but were
informed that this button press would not affect which card
was selected by the computer. After 2 sec, a randomly se-
lected card was “turned over” by the computer. For both
trial types, the word remained onscreen for 2 sec, after
which the trial ended. In Experiment 1, the set of words
comprised a list of positive and negative trait adjectives,
whereas in Experiment 2, the stimulus set comprised a list
of abstract and concrete nouns. Although the location of
the word on “self” trials was determined by participantsʼ se-
lection, the order in which words appeared was predeter-
mined by a randomized computer algorithm.
The numbering of the cards began with “1” and pro-
ceeded consecutively such that the four cards shown on
the first turnwerelabeled1 through 4, the four cardsshown
on the second turn were labeled 5 through 8, and so on.
Once the last four cards had been shown, cards were shown
from the beginning of the deck, with the exception that
cards that had been selected by the participant or the com-
puter in previous turns were removed from the deck (e.g.,
if the “2” c a r dh a db e e ns e l e c t e do nt h ef i r s tt r i a l ,t h e1 4 t h
trial would consist of the cards “1”“ 3”“ 4,” and “5”). In
this way, participants were given the sense that they were
choosing a specific card to reveal a specific word. Trials
continued to iterate through the deck until all cards had
been chosen (i.e., 52 trials). Participants completed two
such runs in Experiment 1 (52 self and 52 other trials) and
four runs in Experiment 2 (104 self and 104 other trials),
each of which was 392 sec in length. To optimize esti-
mation of the event-related fMRI response, trials were
intermixed in a pseudorandom order and separated by a
variable interstimulus interval (2000–10000 msec; Dale,
Figure 1. A schematic diagram of trials from the agentic self task.
Participants first saw a cue (“YOU” or “COMPUTER”) for 1 sec indicating
whether they were going to select a card or the computer was.
Subsequently, four numbered cards were presented for 2 sec, during
which time participants selected a card if it was their turn or pressed a
dummy key if it was not. Finally, the number on one of the cards
disappeared and was replaced by a word for 2 sec. Following YOU cues
(self trials), the word appeared on the card selected by the participant;
following COMPUTER cues (other trials), the word appeared on a
randomly selected card.
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1999), during which participants passively viewed a fixation
crosshair.
Conceptual Self-reference Task
All participants in Experiment 1 and 15 participants in Ex-
periment 2 also completed two runs of the conceptual
self-reference task used by Heatherton et al. (2006), Moran
et al. (2006), Macrae et al. (2004), and Kelley et al. (2002).
On each trial, subjects saw a positive or negative trait
adjective and were asked to judge either how well the
word described themselves or how well it described
then-president George W. Bush by choosing a number
from 1 (poor descriptor)t o4( good descriptor). The tar-
get word and a cue indicating either self or Bush were dis-
played in white text on a black background. Each trial
lasted 4 sec, and each run consisted of 50 trials (25 of each
q u e s t i o nt y p e ) ,a g a i ni n t e r m i x e di nap s e u d o r a n d o m
order and separated by a variable interstimulus interval
(400–8000 msec), for a total run length of 260 sec.
Recognition Memory Test
Immediately after scanning, participants from Experiment 1
completed a surprise recognition memory test for the
words they had seen in both the agentic and concep-
tual self-processing tasks. This memory test comprised a
random-ordered presentation of the 104 old words from
the agentic self-reference task, the 100 words from the con-
ceptual self-reference task, and 208 novel foils that had not
appeared during scanning. For each trial, participants were
simply asked to press one of two computer keys to indi-
cate whether the word was “old”or“new.”Thememorytest
p r o c e e d e di nas e l f - p a c e dm a n n e r .
Participants in Experiment 2 completed a similar sur-
prise recognition memory test that comprised a randomly
ordered presentation of the 208 words that they had
seen during the agentic self-reference task only, along with
208 novel foils. This memory test was administered imme-
diately after the completion of the agentic self-reference
task, while participants were still in the scanner (during
the collection of the structural data). Participants were
given three response options: “old” with high confidence;
“old” with low confidence; and “new.” Following earlier
studiesthathaveexaminedtheneuralcorrelatesofsuccess-
ful encoding (Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; Brewer,
Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Kelley et al.,
1998; Wagner et al., 1998), subsequent memory analysis
was restricted to items judged “new” or that were remem-
bered with high confidence, so as to ensure that “old” re-
sponses truly reflected recollection of the earlier word
rather than including serendipitously correct guesses.
Imaging Procedure
Experiment 1 was conducted using a 1.5-Tesla Siemens
Avanto scanner with a standardhead coil.Ahigh-resolution
T1-weighted structural scan (MP-RAGE) preceded the four
functional runs. Experiment 2 was conducted using a
3.0-Tesla Trio scanner with a standard head coil. A high-
resolution T1-weighted structural scan (MP-RAGE) was
conducted following the four functional runs for the
agentic self-reference task and preceding the two func-
tional runs for the conceptual self-reference task. Across
both experiments, functional runs used a gradient-echo,
echo-planar pulse sequence (TR = 2 sec; TE = 35 m;
3.75 × 3.75 in-plane resolution; 26 axial slices; 5 mm
thick; 1 mm skip). Each functional run for the agentic self-
processingtaskcomprised196volumeacquisitions,whereas
each functional run for the conceptual self-processing task
comprised 130 volume acquisitions. Stimuli were projected
with an Apple MacBook laptop running MATLAB v7.4 and
PsyScope for OS X (L. Bonatti, International School of Ad-
vanced Studies, Trieste, Italy) onto a screen at the end of
the magnet bore that participants viewed by way of a mirror
mounted on the head coil. A pillow and foam cushions were
placed inside the head coil to minimize head movement.
Data Analysis
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM2
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK). First, functional data were time-corrected for differ-
ences in acquisition time between slices for each whole-
brain volume and realigned to correct for head movement.
Functional data were then transformed into a standard
anatomical space (3-mm isotropic voxels) based on the
ICBM 152 brain template (MontrealNeurologicalInstitute).
Normalized data were then spatially smoothed (8 mm full-
width-at-half-maximum [FWHM]) using a Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear
model, in which trials were modeled using a canonical he-
modynamic response function, its temporal derivative, and
additional covariates of no interest (a session mean and a
linear trend). Comparisons of interest were implemented
as linear contrasts using a random-effects model. Regions
of interest were identified using a statistical criterion of
25 or more contiguous voxels at a voxelwise threshold of
p < .001. This cluster size was selected on the basis of a
Monte Carlo simulation (S. Slotnick, Boston College) of
our brain volume, which found that this cluster extent
cutoff provided an experiment-wise threshold of p <. 0 5 ,
corrected for multiple comparisons. Additional statistical
comparisons between conditions were conducted using
ANOVA procedures on the parameter estimates associated
with each trial type.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
Behavioral Data
To examine participantsʼ memory for items encountered
during the agentic and conceptual self-processing tasks,
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we first calculated a corrected recognition score for each
participant as the proportionofpreviously presented items
that were correctly judged to be old (hits) minus the pro-
portion of novel items that were erroneously judged to be
old (false alarms). Replicating demonstrations of enhanced
memory for items processed self-referentially (Symons
& Johnson, 1997), participants demonstrated better mem-
oryon theconceptualself-referencetaskfor trials on which
they judged how well an adjective described themselves
(M = 0.54, SD = 0.15, range = 0.23 to 0.77) than an-
other person (M =0 . 4 5 ,SD = 0.18, range = 0.21 to 0.77)
[t(12) = 3.70, p < .01, Cohenʼs d = 1.07; see Table 1]. Like-
wise, replicating the results of Cloutier and Macrae (2008),
participants demonstrated better memory on the agentic
self-reference task for trials on which they selected a card
(M = 0.21, SD = 0.12, range = −0.02 to 0.37) than those
on which the computer randomly selected one (M =0 . 1 1 ,
SD = 0.08, range = 0.0 to 0.25) [t(12) = 3.85, p <. 0 0 3 ,
d = 1.11]. On the conceptual task, participants were sig-
nificantly faster to make judgments during self trials (M =
1739 msec, SD = 137) than other trials (M = 1837 msec,
SD =19 3)[t(12) = 2.79, p<. 05 ,d= 0.81]. No comparable
analysis of response latencies was possible for the agentic
task because participants were asked to make a meaningful
response only on self trials.
fMRI Data
Using a whole-brain, random-effects analysis, we identified
brain regions that were more active for the comparison of
self > other on the conceptual self-reference task. Replicat-
ing earlier results, greater BOLD signal was observed for
self than other trials in an extensive region of vMPFC (com-
prising 658 voxels centered at an MNI coordinate of 4, 32,
6); additional regions of differential activation included the
posterior extent of the inferior temporal gyrus, left inferior
frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate, and right motor cortex
(Table 2). To examine whether agentic self-referential pro-
cessing draws on the same processes as those tapped by
the conceptual self-reference, we then examined the re-
sponseinthisvMPFCregionduringtheagenticself-reference
(card-selection) task. No difference between self-selected
and other-selected cards was observed (Figure 1) [t(12) =
0.76, ns, d = 0.22], suggesting that oneʼs agentic sense
of self did not draw on the same cognitive processes as
those engaged by conceptual self-reference. That vMPFC
response was modulated differently by conceptual and
agentic self-reference was confirmed by a significant two-
way interaction of Task (conceptual, agentic) × Chooser
(self, other) [F(1, 12) = 14.75, p <. 0 0 3 ,d = 1.11].
Table 1. Proportion of “Old” Responses by Trial Type during
the Recognition Tests in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment 1
Agentic Task Conceptual Task
Self 0.43 (0.16) 0.77 (0.11)
Other 0.34 (0.12) 0.68 (0.14)
Novel 0.22 (0.12) 0.23 (0.10)
Experiment 2
High Confidence Low Confidence
Self 0.44 (0.14) 0.27 (0.16)
Other 0.36 (0.17) 0.30 (0.19)
Novel 0.13 (0.12) 0.33 (0.21)
Values in parentheses represent the standard deviations associated with
each trial type. The proportion of “old” responses to novel items is the false
alarm rate; corrected recognition scores were calculated by subtracting
these values from the corresponding proportion of old responses to words
previously presented as either self or other trials. In Experiment 2, partici-
pants only completed the recognition memory test for items presented
during the agentic task. Responses from this experiment are presented
separately for “old” responses accompanied by high and low confidence.
Table 2. Peak Voxel, BrodmannʼsA r e a ,a n dN u m b e ro fV o x e l s
for Brain Regions Obtained from the Random-effects Contrast
of Self and Other Trials on the Conceptual Self-reference Task,
p < .05, Corrected (Experiment 1)
Region x y z BA Voxels t
Self > Other
vMPFC 4 32 6 24 658 7.56
Lateral occipito-temporal
sulcus
44 −58 −6 37 475 14.10
Cerebellum 26 −44 −46 – 103 5.99
26 −44 −20 – 61 5.69
−16 −46 −16 – 100 5.58
Postcentral gyrus 64 −30 34 40 76 5.80
L Superior temporal
sulcus
−58 −28 18 42 39 4.90
L Inferior frontal gyrus −60 0 12 6 37 6.72
R Superior temporal
sulcus
64 −34 20 42 36 4.97
Occipital cortex −24 −86 26 31 32 4.67
Putamen −16 8 −8 – 34 5.16
Cingulate sulcus 6 −32 52 6 30 4.86
−10 −28 44 31 30 4.73
Other > Self
Inferior temporal sulcus −62 −8 −26 20 39 6.60
Orbital gyrus −48 30 −14 47 28 5.00
t Values reflect the statistical difference between the two conditions, as
computed by SPM2. Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological In-
stitute stereotaxic space. BA = Brodmannʼs area; vMPFC = ventromedial
prefrontal cortex; R = right; L = left.
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Which brain regions were modulated by the agentic self-
reference task? To address this question, we used a whole-
brain, random-effects analysis to identify the pattern of
BOLD response that differentiated between self > other
trials on the agentic task. This contrast revealed bilateral
anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and right-lateralized re-
gions of the middle and superior frontal gyrus (Table 3),
but no differences in medial prefrontal cortex. These four
regions were subsequently examined for differences be-
tween self and other on the conceptual self-reference task.
Specifically, the parameter estimates associated with self
(conceptual) and other (conceptual) were extracted from
these regions, and ANOVA was used to test for differences
between the two trial types. In none of these four regions
did we observe any difference between self and other on
the conceptual task (all four observed p values were
>.47). That the response of these regions was modulated
differently by conceptual and agentic self-reference was
confirmed by significant two-way interactions of Task (con-
ceptual, agentic) × Chooser (self, other) in all regions
identified by the agentic task (all Fs>6 . 4 5 ;a l lps<. 0 3 ) .
We further observed significant three-way Region × Trial
type × Task interactions when comparing vMPFC data
with each of these regions, all Fs > 43.5, all ps<1 0
−5,
demonstrating that the pattern of conceptual self > other
modulations was qualitatively different in vMPFC than in
the four regions isolated by the agentic self-reference task
(Figure 2).
Experiment 2
To test whether brain regions isolated by the agentic self
task played a functionally important role in encoding a re-
presentation of oneʼs goals and actions, Experiment 2 ex-
amined whether the response in such regions during the
agentic task correlated with subsequent memory for items
selected by participants. Each participantʼs performance
on a test of memory for items in the card selection task
was used to retroactively conditionalize encoding items
into those that were subsequently remembered versus
those that were subsequently forgotten as a function of
whether the item had been selected by the participant or
by the computer. To the extent that regions such as the
IPS play an important, selective role in representing the
agentic self, activity in those regions should distinguish
between remembered versus forgotten items, but only
for those that were initially selected agentically and not
for computer-selected items.
Behavioral Data
Analysis of corrected recognition scores again confirmed
that memory performance was better for items that parti-
cipants self-selected (M =0 . 2 6 ,SD = 0.29, range = −0.16
to 0.82) than those randomly selected by the computer
(M = 0.21, SD = 0.30, range = −0.10 to 0.81) [t(17) =
2.14, p <. 0 5 ,d = 0.52; Table 1]. As in Experiment 1, on
the conceptual task, participants were significantly faster to
make judgments during self trials (M =1 7 3 9m s e c ,SD =
164) than other trials (M =1 8 8 4m s e c ,SD = 244) [t(15) =
3.45, p <. 0 1 ,d =0 . 9 9 ] .
fMRI Data
A whole-brain, random-effects comparison of all self >
other trials on the agentic self-reference task replicated
the results of Experiment 1, again identifying bilateral re-
gions of the IPS that were associated with a significantly
greater response for trials on which participants agenti-
cally selected a card versus those on which they passively
watched the computer select one. Additional loci were
identified in the bilateral superior and middle frontal gyri.
In general, the size of the regions identified from this
contrast was more extensive than those observed in Ex-
periment 1, most likely the result of the greater statistical
power provided by a larger sample of participants and
greater number of trials in Experiment 2, as well as the
stronger field strength at which this experiment was con-
ducted (see Table 4).
Table 3. Peak Voxel, Brodmannʼs Area, and Number of Voxels
for Brain Regions Obtained from the Random-effects Contrast
of Self and Other Trials on the Agentic Self-reference Task,
p < .05, Corrected (Experiment 1)
Region x y z BA Voxels t
Self > Other
R Intraparietal sulcus 44 −48 50 40 265 5.74
R Middle frontal gyrus 46 28 30 9 117 5.92
L Intraparietal sulcus −48 −44 50 40 35 4.99
R Superior frontal gyrus 24 4 56 6 26 5.13
Other > Self
L Occipital cortex −34 −72 24 39 232 9.79
−10 −96 14 18 149 6.06
−10 −80 0 28 5.66
R Occipital cortex 20 −94 10 18 111 7.45
20 −82 −16 18 31 5.04
16 −88 30 19 47 5.03
Superior temporal sulcus −60 −16 −14 21 172 8.47
Supramarginal gyrus −58 −58 10 39 162 6.07
Putamen −32 −46 – 92 5.93
Parahippocampal gyrus −26 −48 −8 19 67 8.65
Cerebellum 2 −52 −24 – 37 5.58
Precentral gyrus −26 −40 74 2 29 5.68
Insular gyrus −36 −6 −18 21 25 4.73
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Using an automated search algorithm (R. Poldrack, Uni-
versity of California Los Angeles) to define regions of in-
terest around local maxima identified from this contrast
(peak voxels separated by a minimum of 8 mm), we ex-
amined whether activity in these areas was correlated
with individualsʼ subsequent memory performance. For
each participant, we segregated trials into those that
were later remembered from those that were later for-
gotten as a function of whether items were agentically
selected by participants or randomly selected by the com-
puter (see Methods), resulting in four types of trials: self
hits, self misses, other hits,a n dother misses.W et h e ni n -
terrogated each of these regions using ANOVA proce-
dures on the parameter estimates associated with each
of these trial types to identify activity that was selectively
correlated with subsequent memory performance for
items agentically selected by the participants themselves,
but not randomly selected by the computer. Specifically,
such regions would be identified by three statistical fea-
tures: (1) reliably greater BOLD response for self hits than
self misses; (2) statistically indistinguishable response be-
tween other hits and other misses; and (3) a significant
two-way interaction of Chooser (self, other) × Memory
performance (hit, miss). Four such regions were identi-
fied: extensive posterior areas of the left and right IPS as
well as more restricted regions in the left middle and right
superior frontal gyri (Table 5).
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Figure 2. Selected brain
regions defined from the
contrast of self > other,
separately for the conceptual
(top) and agentic (bottom)
self-reference tasks in
Experiment 1. Replicating
earlier research, vMPFC
differentiated between self and
other on the conceptual task;
however, no difference between
trial types was observed in this
region for the agentic task.
Conversely, bilateral regions
of the IPS differentiated
between self and other trials
on the agentic, but not the
conceptual, self-reference
task. The right side of each
panel displays the parameter
estimates associated with
each of the four trial types
(the bottom displays results
from the right IPS). Error bars
represent confidence interval
for within-subject designs
(Loftus & Masson, 1994).
Table 4. Peak Voxel, Brodmannʼs Area, and Number of Voxels
for Brain Regions Obtained from the Random-effects Contrast
of Self and Other Trials on the Agentic Self-reference Task,
p < .05, Corrected (Experiment 2)
Region x y z BA Voxels t
Self > Other
R Intraparietal sulcus 44 −32 44 40 1874 4.71
L Intraparietal sulcus −40 −36 46 40 1631 4.83
L Superior frontal gyrus −22 −4 54 6 1025 8.09
L Middle frontal gyrus −56 10 38 9 379 4.56
R Superior frontal gyrus 26 4 62 6 334 4.48
Anterior cingulate cortex 12 40 20 32 61 4.28
Other > Self
L Occipital −14 −96 −10 17 231 4.36
−16 −96 20 19 76 6.75
R Occipital 12 −86 32 19 124 3.94
L Fusiform −28 −54 −10 19 60 6.28
R Insula 42 −8 −3 13 50 3.56
Anterior cingulate cortex −6 26 2 24 29 5.81
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To confirm that memory performance on the agentic
self-referential task was not likewise correlated with activ-
ity in vMPFC, we defined a region of interest from sepa-
rate functional runs in which participants completed a
conceptual self-reference task identical to that used in Ex-
periment 1. Replicating earlier results, a region of vMPFC
was identified from the contrast of self > other (MNI co-
ordinates: 0, 46, 0). However, analysis of the response in
this region during the agentic self-reference task revealed
no significant differences between hits and misses for either
self-selected or computer-selected items (both ps > .50),
demonstrating that vMPFC activity did not contribute to
successful self-referential encoding for the agentic task.
Finally,weconductedanauxiliaryrandom-effects,whole-
brain analysis that identified regions demonstrating a sig-
nificant two-way interaction of Target (self, other) × Task
(agentic, conceptual). This analysis provided confirma-
tory support for the results described above. A region of
vMPFC(772voxelscenteredat4,46,2)showedsignificantly
greater difference for self > other on the conceptual task
than on the agentic task. Inversely, a region of the left IPS
(325 voxels centered at −40, −42, 52) showed significantly
greater difference for self > other on the agentic than con-
ceptual task. At a relaxed statistical threshold of p <. 0 0 5 ,
a comparable region of the right IPS was also observed
(97 voxels centered at 44, −32, 48). The equivalent analy-
sis for Experiment 1 did not yield any brain regions, most
likely due to its reduced statistical power (Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
Capitalizing on a well-characterized memory phenomenon—
the self-reference effect—results of two experiments de-
monstrateddistinctneuralbasesunderlyingdifferentforms
of self-referential processing. Replicating a number of earlier
studies of conceptual self-reference, Experiment 1 demon-
strated that making judgments of oneʼs own personality
traits (compared to those of another person) was associated
with preferential modulation of vMPFC. However, activity
in this region did not differentiate between self and other
processingonataskthatmanipulatedagenticaspectsofself.
Instead, self-involvement during the agentic choice task
was associated with greater response in the IPS, a region
previously linked to goal-directed action and motor plan-
ning. Experiment 2 extended these results by demonstrat-
ing that IPS activity during the initial agentic self-reference
task was predictive of the mnemonic fate of items selected
by participants. Words that went on to be remembered
were associated with greater IPS response during the card-
selection task than those that went on to be forgotten, but
only if those words were “revealed” under cards actively se-
lected by the participant (and not for those selected ran-
domly by the computer). This correlation with subsequent
memory suggests that, rather than being epiphenomenally
“along for the ride,” the IPS plays an active functional role
in generating a sense of goal-directed authorship. In con-
trast, no such correlation between memory performance
andneuralresponsewasobservedinvMPFC,despitethefact
that activity in this region has been shown previously to cor-
relate with memory for items processed in reference to the
conceptual self (Macrae et al., 2004).
Despite our subjective experience of being a coherent
self, the current results suggest that some aspects of selfhood
relyondistinctcognitiveprocessessubservedbydissociable
neural mechanisms. On the one hand, extant cognitive
neurosciencefindingshavestronglylinkedMPFCtoavariety
of self-related processing in addition to knowledge of our
ownpersonalitytraits(i.e.,conceptualself-reference).These
include autobiographical memory (Maguire, 2001), moni-
toring oneʼs own thoughts (Mason et al., 2007), reporting
oneʼs attitudes (Mitchell, 2009b), and the subjective ex-
perience of emotion (Phan et al., 2002), and have led to
claims that “the self”engages a unique set of cognitive oper-
ations subserved specifically by MPFC (Schneider et al.,
Table 5. Brain Regions Obtained from the Contrast of Self > Other on the Agentic Self-reference Task (Experiment 2) that Also
Demonstrated a Selective Correlation with Subsequent Memory for Self Trials
Region x y z Voxels Self Other Interaction
R Intraparietal sulcus 16 −66 50 382 0.016 0.767 0.012
30 −56 54 354 0.009 0.698 0.013
34 −74 42 286 0.029 0.974 0.010
40 −64 56 207 0.005 0.487 0.010
34 −64 30 159 0.012 0.569 0.004
L Intraparietal sulcus −16 −68 48 275 0.001 0.631 0.029
L Middle frontal gyrus −48 32 32 62 0.003 0.971 0.014
−40 32 22 51 0.003 0.904 0.013
R Superior frontal gyrus 26 4 62 297 0.047 0.883 0.021
The three rightmost columns report p values associated with comparisons of hits and misses. The self and other columns report the significance level
achieved by the t tests of self hits > self misses and other hits > others misses, respectively. The interaction column reports the significance level
achieved by the two-way Chooser (self, other) × Memory performance (hit, miss) interaction.
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2008; Uddin et al., 2007; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; cf.
Gillihan & Farah, 2005). In contrast, the current study dem-
onstrates that one central aspect of selfhood—the sense
of being an active, voluntary, and free agent of change in
the environment—does not rely on cortical midline struc-
tures such asMPFC. This pattern ofresultsisconsistentwith
the recently articulated hypothesis that MPFC subserves ab-
stract, probabilistic, and “fuzzy” cognitive processes, such
as those inherent in conceptual self-reference, the experi-
ence of emotion, and introspective awareness (Mitchell,
2009b). In contrast, MPFC contributes less to concrete, dis-
crete, and specific mental operations of the kind needed to
select a particular course of action and monitor its specific
outcome in the environment. In the case of agentic self-
processing as operationalized here, such discrete and spe-
cific processing appears instead to be subserved by the IPS.
Althoughtheconceptualandagentictasksclearlydiffered
from each other in a number of ways, each was designed
to isolate a discrete aspect of selfhood. As operationalized
in dozens of studies since the 1970s (Symons & Johnson,
1997), the conceptual self-reference task manipulated
whether perceivers introspected about their own personal-
ity traits and dispositions or judged those of a familiar, but
not personally known, other. In contrast, following earlier
work (Cloutier & Macrae, 2008), during the agentic self-
reference task, participants either engaged in goal-directed
action toward an idiosyncratically chosen item or watched
passively as an item was selected randomly. The central
questionofinterestinthecurrentstudieswaswhetherthese
two ways of manipulating self-involvement (conceptual vs.
agentic) rely on overlapping or dissociated neural sub-
strates. Although differences between the two paradigms
undermine any direct comparison between the conceptual
and agentic tasks, the logic of the analyses used in both
experiments obviates the need to contrast the tasks to each
other. Global differences between the tasks, such as ob-
vious disparities in the visual display or task instructions,
were subtracted out by contrasting the self and other con-
ditions from within the same task. As such, comparisons
of interest focused on whether the process(es) isolated by
the agentic task draws on the same underlying neural
substrates as those isolated by the conceptual task. The ob-
servation of a three-way interaction of Task (conceptual,
agentic) × Target (self, other) × Brain region (vMPFC,
IPS) addressed this question without the need to compare
the tasks to each directly, suggesting that the aspects of self
isolated by the agentic task do not overlap completely with
those aspects of self isolated by the conceptual task.
Likewise, the subsequent memory approach used in
Experiment 2 further underscores the specificity of the
cognitive processes isolated by these tasks. Such analyses
have been used frequently in the memory literature to
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Figure 3. Brain regions
defined from the contrast of
self > other, separately for the
conceptual (top) and agentic
(bottom) self-reference tasks in
Experiment 2. The right side of
both panels displays parameter
estimates associated with trials
on the agentic task, segregated
by whether words were
subsequently remembered
(solid bars) or forgotten
(striped bars). Replicating
Experiment 1, vMPFC
differentiated between self and
other trials on the conceptual
task but did not distinguish
between trial types on the
agentic task. Furthermore,
vMPFC activity did not correlate
with later memory for self or
other trials on the agentic task.
In contrast, bilateral regions
of the IPS showed greater
activation for self > other trials
on the agentic self-reference
task, and, moreover, activity
in this region differentiated
between items that were
subsequently remembered
(hits) versus forgotten (misses),
but only for self trials on the
agentic task. The bottom
panel displays results from
the right IPS.
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distinguish brain regions that make significant processing
contributions to task performance from those that are co-
activated by the task for extraneous or peripheral reasons
(Paller & Wagner, 2002; Wagner, Koutstaal, & Schacter,
1999). For example, although motor cortex might be en-
gaged by an orienting task that requires a behavioral re-
sponse, activity in this region would be unlikely to predict
whether an item goes on to be remembered, because mo-
tor processing rarely contributes importantly to successful
memory encoding. The current data capitalize on this as-
pect of the subsequent memory approach in two ways.
First, our findings underscore the insensitivity of vMPFC
to differences between agentic self and other. In addition
to failing to distinguish self from other during the agentic
task, vMPFC activity also failed to differentiate between
remembered and forgotten items on the agentic task (re-
gardless of chooser), suggesting that any vMPFC coactivity
during the agentic task was not functionally important to
task performance. More importantly, IPS activity was pre-
dictive of later memory for items actively chosen by the
self, but not for “other” items. This result suggests that,
rather than being modulated by the agentic task generally,
IPSactivitycontributesselectivelytomemoryforoneʼsow n
actions. Taken together, these results suggest that the two
self-referentialtasksisolatedistinctcognitiveprocesseswith
distinct neural bases.
Functional Basis of the “Agentic” Self
The link between representations of oneʼs actions and the
IPS has been presaged by a number of researchers. For
example, in a series of studies, Grafton, Hamilton, and col-
leagues have demonstrated the role of the anterior IPS in
maintaining a representation of the target of oneʼs action
and planning the motor commands needed to bring about
an intended result (Grafton & Hamilton, 2007; Tunik, Rice,
Hamilton,& Grafton,2007;Hamilton& Grafton,2006).For
example, Hamilton and Grafton (2006) demonstrated that
regions of the IPS were activated during the attribution of
a particular goal by showing that these regions adapted
to repeated actions directed at the same goal, responding
less to a second reach for the same object than during the
first one. Likewise, a number of other studies have found
that regions in the IPS play an important role in working
memory for both visuospatial and kinesthetic information
related to oneʼs own actions (Fiehler, Burke, Engel, Bien,
& Rosler, 2008; Goodale & Milner, 1992). For example,
Fiehler et al. (2008) showed that left IPS activity increased
linearly as participants were obliged to maintain active re-
presentations of increasing numbers of recent actions.
Together, these results suggest that the IPS may play an
important role in representing oneʼs goals and the means
by which to realize them, and may therefore be engaged
preferentially by situations in which one freely authors an
action (i.e., in which the agentic self is engaged).
This interpretation is consistent with previous work by
Cloutier and Macrae (2008), who found that active, free
choice was critical to producing better memory for se-
lected items. When participants were denied the opportu-
nity to choosea cardby instead simply having one assigned
to them, memory for such items was equivalent to those
selected by another person. Future work will be needed
to address whether preventing subjects from engaging
in active, free choice would likewise reduce activation
in the region of the IPS associated here with agentic self-
reference. Although both the selection and execution of
an action were not disentangled in the current study, we
suspect that the IPS will contribute most prominently to
situations in which participants actively choose a particular
action from among equally possible alternatives.
Intriguingly, in addition to contributing to representa-
tions of oneʼs own goal-directed actions, the IPS has been
implicated in perceiving othersʼ actions. A sizeable number
of neuroimaging studies have characterized a “mirror neu-
ron system” in the human brain (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001,
2004; Iacoboni et al., 1999). Such work has found that,
although the most robust activity in the IPS accompanies
execution of an action, there is also a measurable response
in this region when participants merely observe someone
else acting. However, in the current study, no modulation
of IPS activity over baseline was observed during “other”
trials on the agentic task. This observation is consistent
with mirror neuron accounts, which suggest that regions
implicated in mirroring (such as the IPS) will be engaged
only when an individual has direct perceptual input (either
visual or auditory) about the current goal-directed move-
ments of another person. Because our participants did
not directly perceive the movements of another person
but were simply informed about the outcome of a choice
that was not theirs, we strongly suspect that the IPS should
not be modulated by the “other” condition of the agentic
self task. This hypothesis is indirectly supported by the
observation that IPS activity was functionally related to
behavior (i.e., memory performance) only for agentically
chosen self trials, but not passively viewed other trials.
Likewise, the specificity of the correlations between IPS
activity and subsequent memory rules out an important
class of alternative explanations for these results. Although
one might expect participants to devote greater attention
to trials on which they select a card themselves (than those
onwhichacard israndomlyselected),thefactthatthesub-
sequent memory effect in the IPS was observed only for
self-selected items makes it unlikely that activity in this re-
gion indexed global differences in attention between the
two conditions. If IPS activity reflected greater attention
to self items, and if such enhanced attention supports
better memory encoding for those items, then IPS activity
would have also distinguished those other-selected items
to which participants paid close attention, and thus, later
remembered from those to which participants attended
superficially and therefore forgot. However, the selective
relation between IPS activity and memory only for self
items suggests that this region contributes specifically to
cognitive processes important for representing the targets
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of oneʼs own actions. Moreover, that this subsequent
memory effect was not observed in brain areas typically
implicated in deeper levels of encoding—such as inferior
frontal and medial temporal regions (Otten, Henson, &
Rugg, 2001)—suggests that the current operationalization
of agentic self-reference did not simply produce more
elaborative, “deeper” encoding of chosen information.
Conclusion
Although the current results suggest the separability of two
components of the self, they do not address the question
of whether these two components are instantiated by cog-
nitive mechanisms dedicated exclusively to self-processing.
In a recent review, Gillihan and Farah (2005) pointed out
that many cognitive mechanisms seem to be involved in
self-referential processing, not all of which may be devoted
solely to the self. Nevertheless, the current research sug-
gests that different aspects of the self rely on distinct neu-
ral systems and, moreover, that these different systems
can each independently support common effects of self-
involvement such as enhanced memory for items relevant
to the self. Although we have focused on two particular
components of our self representations—the conceptual
and agentic selves—other commentators have discussed
a number of other potential candidates for dissociable as-
pects of the self. For example, in one influential treatment,
Neisser (1988) described a number of distinct components
of selfhood, such as a “conceptual self” that represents our
understandingofourownpersonalitytraitsanddispositions;
an “ecological self” that represents our sense of authoring
ourownactionsintheenvironment(similartowhatwehave
here called the “agentic self”); a “narrative self” that main-
tains our sense of personal history and autobiographical
memory; and a “social self” that reflects an understanding
of our roles, obligations, and rights as individuals with a
specific place in our social networks (also see Boyer et al.,
2005; Gallagher, 2000). These proposed aspects of the self
are fertile ground for future research, including investiga-
tions aimed at characterizing dissociable cognitive mecha-
nisms that support these forms of self-processing. We
hope that future work will elucidate how these multiple as-
pects of selfhood are bound together into the coherent
sense of a unitary self that marks healthy human cognition.
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